Brute-force detection doesn't cover Vaultwarden or Navidrome native logins #121
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mysticalsoap/docker#121
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The ForwardAuth bypass trades moved the auth boundary into each app, but log-based detection only followed for some of them. CrowdSec's acquis tails traefik/authelia/jellyfin/seerr/calibre-web — the two remaining public native-auth surfaces are invisible to it:
/identity/connect/token) is public. Protections today: Vaultwarden's built-in login ratelimit and Traefik's genericratelimit@file(100/s, tuned for burst, not credential guessing). This is the highest-value credential target in the stack. The hub has a vaultwarden collection (parser + brute-force scenario); needsEXTENDED_LOGGING/LOG_FILEto a bind-mounted file (same/var/log/<app>pattern as jellyfin) or a docker acquis source.navidrome-whitelist.yaml, the false-ban fix) but nothing detects failed logins. Check the hub first; failed-login log lines are regular enough for a local parser+scenario if nothing's there.Related asymmetry on the metrics side: only Authelia's failures alert (
AutheliaHighFailedAuthn). Once CrowdSec decisions exist for these sources they surface throughcs_active_decisionsfor free; a Loki-ruler rule (#105) is the alternative if a hub collection turns out not to exist.